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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
FREDERICK GERMONTO, : Case No. 20020304-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant/Appellant Frederick Germonto ("Appellant11 or "Germonto") was 
convicted of Escape, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 
(1999). The Honorable Terry Christiansen, Judge, Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah entered judgment on March 19, 2002. R. 179; see judgment in 
Addendum A. Germonto filed a timely notice of appeal on April 8, 2002. This Court 
has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999) states: 
76-8-309. Escape and aggravated escape - Consecutive sentences -
Definitions 
(1) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without 
authorization. 
(2) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the commission of an 
escape he uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in section 76-1-601, or 
causes serious bodily injury to another. 
(3) Aggravated escape is a first degree felony. 
(4) Escape from a state prison is a second degree felony. 
(5) Any other escape is a third degree felony. 
(6) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape under this section 
shall run consecutively with any other sentence. 
(7) For purposes of this part: 
(a) "Confinement" means: 
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a 
contract with the Utah Department of Corrections after being 
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been 
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole; 
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or 
sentencing or housed in a county jail after sentencing and 
commitment and the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided or the prisoner is not on parole; or 
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest. 
(b) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without 
warrant, or confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure 
confinement of juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to 
an order of the court or sentenced and committed and the sentence 
has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole. 
A person is considered confined in the state prison if he: 
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of 
confinement from work release or home visit by the time 
designated for return; 
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation; 
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment, 
pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by 
correctional officers. 
(c) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official custody and 
includes persons under trustee status. 
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: Germonto left a group of prisoners that was being directed back to their 
housing unit and climbed over an inner fence, but was apprehended prior to climbing 
over the outer perimeter fence that divided prison and non-prison property. The issue in 
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this case is whether there was sufficient evidence to support a bindover on the charge of 
escape where Germonto did not leave the total confinement of the prison. 
Standard of Review: To support a bind-over, the state must introduce "sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it." State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9,1J16, 20 P.3d 300. This requires the 
State to present believable evidence as to each of the elements of the crime. IdL, f^l3 
(further citations omitted). In order to determine the elements of the crime, the court 
must interpret the statute under which the defendant is charged. Interpretation of a 
statute involves a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Maestas. 2000 UT App 22, [^11, 997 P.2d 314 (further citation omitted). 
Preservation of the Argument: This argument is preserved. R. 200:31; 20-22; 83-
85; 173. Germonto repeatedly challenged the bindover below; after the lower court 
concluded that a completed escape could occur even if an inmate does not leave the 
confines of the prison, Germonto entered a conditional plea of no contest, expressly 
preserving his right to attack the propriety of the bindover order. R. 200:31; 20-22; 83-
85; 86-99; 113; 173-78; 202[2]:l-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 9, 2000, the State filed an Information charging Germonto with Escape, 
a second degree felony. R. 1-2. A preliminary hearing was held before Third District 
Court Judge Denise Lindberg on August 17, 2000. R. 7, 200. 
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Following the presentation of evidence at the preliminary hearing, Germonto 
argued that he could not be bound over on the crime of escape because he had not left the 
confines of the prison and therefore did not complete an escape. R. 200:31. After the 
parties briefed the matter (R. 11-22), Judge Lindberg, acting as a magistrate, bound 
Germonto over for trial on the charge of escape. R. 83; see. Bindover Order in 
Addendum B. 
Although Judge Lindberg acted as the magistrate, the case was also bound over to 
her. R. 85, 106, 202, 202[2]:2. Germonto filed a pro se motion to quash the bindover, 
labeled as a petition for rehearing, which Judge Lindberg denied. R. 86-88; 202[2]:l-2. 
The case was later transferred to Judge Christiansen in West Valley City. R. 102, 108. 
Germonto renewed his motion to dismiss. R. 113. Germonto also challenged the State's 
ability to ask for a lesser included offense instruction of attempted escape when it was 
proceeding on the escape charge based on an incomplete escape. R. 127-28. 
On March 19, 2002, Germonto entered a conditional plea of no contest, expressly 
reserving his right to appeal the adverse rulings regarding the propriety of the bindover. 
R. 173. This appeal follows. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following evidence was introduced at the preliminary hearing: 
On February 5, 2000, Germonto was an inmate at the Utah State Prison. R. 200:5. 
On that date, prison guard Douglas Vamer was escorting Germonto and other prisoners 
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back from the chapel to their housing unit in the Timpanogos facility of the prison. 
R. 200:1, 5. The guard checked the chapel to make sure that no inmates had remained 
behind. R. 200:5-6. He then followed the inmates as they proceeded toward the 
Timpanogos facility. R. 200:6. 
As he walked behind the group, Varner noticed Germonto about halfway up a ten 
foot chain link fence. R. 200:8. That fence separated the inmate housing yard from the 
outer perimeter area of the prison, and did not have razor wire at the top. R. 200:7-8, 10. 
Varner gave Germonto a verbal command to get off the fence. R. 200:8. 
Germonto proceeded over the inner fence into an area in the prison in which inmates are 
not allowed. R. 200:7, 10. Germonto then ran toward the second or outer perimeter 
fence and attempted to climb it. R. 200:10-11. 
Varner notified the prison guards who were responsible for perimeter security. 
R. 200:11. The perimeter guards drove to the place on the outer fence where Germonto 
was attempting to climb the fence. R. 200:11. The guard told Germonto to get off the 
fence and pulled a gun. R. 200:21. Germonto dropped from the inside of the fence onto 
the prison grounds and began to run southbound on prison grounds parallel to the outer 
fence. R. 200:11-12, 17, 20. Germonto stopped running when he reached a certain 
point. R. 220:13. Germonto stood around for several minutes before he was taken back 
into custody. R. 200:14. 
Officers searched Germonto and found that he was wearing multiple layers of 
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clothing. R. 200:24. In addition, Germonto told an officer that if he had one more 
minute, he would have made it over the outer perimeter fence. R. 200:24. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The plain language of the escape statute requires that a person leave "official 
custody" in order to commit the crime of escape. The statute defines "official custody" 
for an inmate such as Germonto as "confinement in a state prison." The statute defines 
"confinement" for an inmate such as Germonto as being "housed in a state prison." The 
plain language of the statute therefore indicates twice that a prison inmate must leave the 
confinement of the prison in order to leave official custody and commit the crime of 
escape. Because the trial court did not require that an inmate leave the confinement of 
the prison in order to commit a completed escape, it did not follow the plain language of 
the statute. The trial court's ruling that the state presented sufficient evidence to bind 
Germonto over on the charge of escape must be reversed because the state did not 
present any evidence demonstrating that Germonto left the confines of the prison. 
Requiring that an inmate leave the confines of the prison in order to commit a 
completed escape saves the escape statute from an unconstitutional interpretation. If the 
statute were interpreted to allow an escape even though the inmate had not left the 
confines of the prison, it would be unconstitutionally void for vagueness. A person of 
ordinary intelligence would not have notice as to what conduct is prohibited and the 
statute would be subject to arbitrary and discriminatory application if the escape statute 
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were interpreted to allow a completed escape even if the inmate did not leave the 
confines of the prison. Any time an inmate was located in an area in which he was not 
permitted, the state would be free to file escape charges, thereby doing away with the 
crime of attempted escape and allowing for arbitrary application of the escape statute. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. UTAH'S ESCAPE STATUTE. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 76-8-309 
(1999). REQUIRES A TOTAL DEPARTURE FROM PRISON 
CONFINEMENT IN ORDER TO CONSTITUTE THE COMPLETED 
CRIME OF ESCAPE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999) defines the crime of escape as follows: 
76-8-309. Escape and aggravated escape - Consecutive sentences -
Definitions 
(1) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without 
authorization. 
(2) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the commission of an 
escape he uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in section 76-1-601, or 
causes serious bodily injury to another. 
(3) Aggravated escape is a first degree felony. 
(4) Escape from a state prison is a second degree felony. 
(5) Any other escape is a third degree felony. 
(6) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape under this section 
shall run consecutively with any other sentence. 
(7) For purposes of this part: 
(a) "Confinement" means: 
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a 
contract with the Utah Department of Corrections after being 
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been 
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole; 
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or 
sentencing or housed in a county jail after sentencing and 
commitment and the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided or the prisoner is not on parole; or 
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(iii) lawfully detained following arrest. 
(b) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without 
warrant, or confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure 
confinement of juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to 
an order of the court or sentenced and committed and the sentence 
has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole. 
A person is considered confined in the state prison if he: 
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of 
confinement from work release or home visit by the time 
designated for return; 
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation; 
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment, 
pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by 
correctional officers. 
(c) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official custody and 
includes persons under trustee status. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999). 
In interpreting a statute, courts first consider the plain language of the statute. 
Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson. 2002 UT App 221, lfl2, 51 P.3d 1288. In 
considering the plain language of a statute, courts "'presume that the legislature used 
each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning.5" Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Svs.. Inc.. 2001 UT 29, ^ [12, 24 P.3d 928 
(citations omitted). Words in a statute that have a commonly accepted meaning should 
be given that common, lay meaning unless there is an indication that the legislature 
intended otherwise. Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co., 2002 UT App 221, ^ [12. 
Courts consider other methods of statutory construction only when a statute is 
ambiguous. The focus in analyzing the statute remains, however, on effectuating the 
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legislative intent. 
In construing a statute, our aim is to give effect to the legislature's intent in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. When doubt or 
uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, an 
analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions 
harmonized in accordance with legislative intent and purpose. One of the 
cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will look to 
the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire 
context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject. Further, 
we have a duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to effectuate 
the legislative intent and avoid and /or save it from constitutional conflict 
or infirmities. 
Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Comm'n.. 2002 UT App 164, ^ [6, 48 P.3d 252 (citing 
In re Marriage of Gonzalez. 2000 UT 28, ^23, 1 P.3d 1074 (citations and quotations 
omitted)). 
The plain language of Utah's escape statute requires that an inmate leave the 
confines of the prison in order to be guilty of escape. The escape statute plainly states 
that "a prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without authorization." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(1). Subsection (7)(b) defines "official custody" as 
"confinement in the state prison" for purposes of this case: 
"Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without warrant, or 
confinement in a state prison, jail institution for secure confinement of 
juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or 
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided or the prisoner is not on parole. A person is considered confined in 
the state prison if he: 
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of confinement from 
work release or home visit by the time designated for return; 
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation; 
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(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment, 
pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by 
correctional officers. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(7)(b) (emphasis added). The last sentence of subsection 
(7)(b) clarifies that a person can be in "official custody" and therefore can be charged 
with escape even if he is not actually being held in the prison on a felony commitment. 
Instead, a person is in "official custody" if he is on work release, being held on a parole 
violation, being held at a county jail on a prison commitment, or being transported to 
court, the hospital or elsewhere. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(7). None of the 
circumstances outlined in the last sentence of subsection (7)(b) apply to Germonto. 
Instead, he was in "official custody" due to his "confinement in the state prison." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(7)(b). 
The escape statute defines "confinement" in subsection (7)(a). In Germonto's 
case, the applicable definition of confinement is set forth in subsection (7)(a)(i) which 
states in relevant part, "'Confinement5 means: (i) housed in a state prison . . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-309(7)(a)(i). The statute essentially states in two places, then, that 
"official custody" means being housed or confined in the state prison for a person such as 
Germonto who is an inmate at the prison. In other words, the statute twice states that the 
"official custody" from which a prison inmate must leave in order to be guilty of an 
escape is confinement or housing in the prison. The plain language of the statute 
therefore requires that an inmate who is housed at the prison "leaves official custody" 
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when he leaves the prison. In this case, where Germonto did not leave the confines of 
the prison, he did not leave official custody. The element of leaving official custody 
therefore cannot be proven and the state did not establish probable cause to believe that 
Germonto committed the completed crime of escape. 
Although decisions from other jurisdictions interpreting statutes with distinct 
language provide little guidance in interpreting the language of Utah's escape statute, the 
decision in State v. Gaines, 372 So.2d 552 (La. 1979) is worth noting because the statute 
at issue in that case is similar to Utah's escape statute. The statute at issue in Gaines 
defined escape as ffthe intentional departure . . . of a person imprisoned, committed, 
detained, or otherwise in the lawful custody of any law enforcement officer .. .from any 
place where such person is lawfully confined" Gaines, 372 So.2d at 554 (quoting La. 
R.S. 14:110(A)) (emphasis added). The court concluded that "any place where [a person 
is] legally confined'1 must necessarily be a place with physical barriers where the person 
is actually confined. Id at 555. In reaching that determination, the court recognized that 
n[a]ny less definitive or more ambiguous definition of the place of confinement would 
render the statute unconstitutionally vague.tf Id. (citing inter alia Papchristou v. 
Jacksonville. 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972)). In addition, the court 
recognized that even if the language were ambiguous, any ambiguity must be resolved in 
favor of the defendant. Gaines, 372 So.2d at 554. Because Gaines departed from an 
okra patch on prison grounds where he was on work detail but did not otherwise leave 
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the confinement or boundaries of the prison, the court held that he did not commit an 
escape when he ran from the line where he was working and continued running even 
after the guard told him to stop and fired shots. Id. at 553-54. 
Like the statute in Gaines, if Utah's escape statute were interpreted to allow a 
conviction for escape when an inmate has not left the confines of the prison, the statute 
would be void for vagueness. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it: (1) fails to 
provide a "person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited . . . " ; (2) "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, 
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application"; or (3) inhibits the exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms. Gravned v. Citv of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108, 108-09(1972). If Utah's 
statute is interpreted so that an escape occurs even though the inmate has not left the 
official custody or confinement of the prison, the statute would violate the first two of 
these prohibitions. 
First, the statute would be unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary 
intelligence would not have notice as to what conduct is prohibited. The statute itself 
defines "official custody" as confinement in the state prison, and defines "confinement" 
as being "housed in the state prison." While the statute defines the term "confinement," 
that term also has an ordinary and commonly understood meaning that is consistent with 
the statutory definition. "Confinement" means imprisonment or being confined, i.e. 
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being held within a boundary or bounded region. Webster's New World College 
Dictionary 306 (4th ed. 1999). A person of ordinary intelligence could not read the 
escape statute and be given notice that he would be guilty of a completed escape even if 
he did not leave the confines of the prison. The escape statute therefore is 
unconstitutionally vague if interpreted to allow a conviction for a completed escape even 
though the inmate did not leave the confines of the prison. 
Second, the statute would be unconstitutionally vague if interpreted to allow a 
completed escape even though Germonto did not leave prison grounds because such an 
interpretation would leave prison guards, judges and juries to decide whether an escape 
occurred any time an inmate entered a restricted area or even left his cell when he was 
not supposed to do so. The escape statute would be enforced arbitrarily to convict some 
inmates who venture out of their cells or escape while subjecting others only to 
administrative sanctions based on the whim of the guards and not on legislative mandate. 
Because the statute would give too much discretion to decide which cases should be 
prosecuted as escapes, it would be void for vagueness if interpreted to allow an escape 
conviction even though the inmate did not leave prison grounds. 
Under the trial court's interpretation of the escape statute, the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague because individuals are not given notice of what conduct is 
prohibited and such interpretation allows for arbitrary and discriminatory application. In 
order to "save [the statute] from constitutional conflicts or infirmities" (Intermountain 
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Slurry Seal 2002 UT App 164, |^6), the trial court's interpretation must be rejected and 
instead the plain language of the statute requiring that an inmate leave the confinement of 
the prison in order to commit an escape must be upheld. 
Requiring that an inmate leave the confines of the prison in order to commit the 
crime of escape by leaving official custody is consistent not only with the plain language 
of the statute and constitutional concerns, but also with the portion of the code that 
outlines the elements for attempt crimes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). "[A] 
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting 
a substantial step toward commission of the offense." IdL. The attempt statute further 
requires not only that any step toward the crime be significant but also that any conduct 
be "strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense" in order to be a 
substantial step establishing the crime of attempt. Id. 
If any conduct on prison grounds by an inmate who moves to an area that is 
restricted or in which he is not supposed to be is considered a completed escape, the 
crime of attempted escape is eviscerated. In other words, any conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward the crime of escape that evidences the intent to escape is an 
escape under the rationale employed by the trial court. Any time an inmate is out of his 
cell when he is not supposed to be, in the cell of another inmate, disregards the order of a 
guard, or otherwise moves "out of bounds," the state could charge the inmate with a 
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completed escape. Such an approach goes against the legislative intent that an inmate 
must leave official custody by leaving the confinement of the prison in order to commit a 
completed escape, and does away with the crime of attempted escape. 
The trial court's interpretation also disregards the purposes and principles of 
construction set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104 (1999). That code section requires 
that the provisions of the code be interpreted so that the elements of a crime are clearly 
defined, the penalties are proportionate to the seriousness of the offense, and arbitrary or 
oppressive treatment is prevented. In addition to failing to give notice of the conduct that 
is prohibited and allowing for arbitrary enforcement, the lower court's interpretation also 
violates section 76-1-104 because it allows for a punishment that is disproportionate to 
the crime. An inmate who does not leave the confinement of the prison nevertheless 
receives the same second degree felony punishment that is given to an inmate who leaves 
the prison. 
In addition, as Germonto pointed out in his pro se filings, the prison has 
administrative rules for internally punishing inmates who move into restricted areas or 
who are otherwise "out of bounds." R. 86-7. When an inmate leaves his or her assigned 
area, the prison has the ability to impose sanctions. Leaving the assigned area is not the 
same as "leaving official custody" and is appropriately punished internally by restricting 
the inmate's privileges, transferring the inmate to a more secure section, requiring that 
the inmate be locked down for a significant portion of the day, or imposing other 
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appropriate internal sanctions. The ability of the prison to impose internal sanctions 
when an inmate leaves his assigned area further demonstrates that in this case where the 
evidence showed that Germonto moved into a restricted area but did not leave the prison, 
he did not leave official custody, as required by the escape statute. See. generally State v. 
Liggett, 363 So.2d 1184, 1186 (La. 1978) (inmate who did not report for work and who 
was later found in another section of the prison was subject to prison disciplinary rules 
but did not commit crime of escape); People v. Lavaie. 70 Cal. App. 4th 456, 462 (1999) 
(inmate was subject to prison disciplinary rules but did not commit crime of escape 
where guards saw two men walking toward the front gate of the prison at 1:00 a.m., and 
defendant was missing from bed count but was later found within a restricted area inside 
the prison). 
In this case, there was not probable cause to believe Germonto committed the 
completed crime of escape because there is no evidence that he left the confines of the 
prison. While the evidence demonstrated that Germonto climbed over the inner fence, 
ran through a restricted area, then began to climb the outer perimeter fence, there is no 
evidence that he got over the outer boundary fence and left the prison. Although the 
state presented sufficient evidence to bind Germonto over on the charge of attempted 
escape, the state failed to establish probable cause to bind Germonto over on the charge 
of escape. The trial court therefore erred in refusing to quash the bindover on that 
charge. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Frederick Germonto, by and through counsel, respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the lower court's ruling upholding the bindover order, 
and remand the case to allow him to withdraw his conditional plea of guilty. 
DATED this Xtu day of November, 2002. 
C~2a**.0. udcubf 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
KAREN STAM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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. .JDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE Oh U I AH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY WFRT VA! LFY OFPT. 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case No. - i v 1i 
Count No. P V U "^  
Honorable f \ ,, ^ A. 
Clerk X i h ^ t U | . 
Reporter,__ i 
Bailiff 
1^121 
Date r \ \< \ 
__lr 'i J - V J ^ C ' V 
n
 f'he miotion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is Q granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the court, • plea of guilty; 
s& plea of no contest; of the offense of { * /(. * >t- \ ^ r i > ^ (\±}( tf, \ ( ::. \ <-A \ j , a felony 
of the HL degree. n a class misdemeanor, being now present incour l^ and 
represented by \C £ > \ ^
 t-x-N , and the State being represented byfo, \^ \(s(»{\ ^ istfiow adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: -^  
• to a indeterminate term not to exceed one year, a at defendant's election. 
o to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
^JBr not to exceed five years; 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
not to exceed years; 
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $_ 
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ 
• 
• 
i l l 
• 
jzf such sentence is to run concurrently with_LAj->Ai_-£>Lv_i -i~ ( r-> 
[ I I 
i : i 
H i 
II II 
± .,u. 4-i such sentence is to run consecutively with. 
upon motion of • State, • Defense, D Court, Court(s) are hereby dismiss 
• 
Defendant is granted a stay of above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of. , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this judgment and commitment. 
Commitment shall issue 
\ > U - l t. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy C(i. \ -*.*: •* n-
ISTRtCT COURT JUDG^ 
Pagt>__L.ul I -
(White-Coi irt) (Yellow-Jail/Pnson/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THL -THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRK 1 t u i KT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ST.A'' o; i 
w.\\Mvnn>.\RTMEN'I 
) " : • 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) NIX >V| K OK 1)1 \( 
VS. ) 
) Case No. 00140027.' 
FREDERICK .1 (iERMONU ) 
_ ) 
reliminary Hearing was held in mis u i ^ ui . , _*. )0 on a ch-d; L;C ot Escape 
c
~~- 1 Custody, a second degree felony. Fo ,u-- presentation of evidence the ( \ . r 
asKcu me parties to provide legal memoranda sup} <n guments. Having considerec the 
evidence and the legal arguments presented, and res< JI- ;bts in favor of the Prosecutnn v-t 
this stage of the proceedings, the Court determines thai uiv Mate has met its ]-•• *••" ^" J 
probable cause to bind Defendant over to sund *~. i1 o- *h" *h'V"" 
• ui«dispun.u ;av.i. .n this case are that on or about February 6, 2000 the Defendant, Mr. 
Uerino.iiw, was a prisoner at the Utah State Prison. On that date Officer Varner was escorting 
prisoners, including the Defendant, back, to a housing unit in the Timpanogos facility of the 
prison. The Officer observed that the Defendant had broken away from the group and was 
scaling a fence separating the inmate housing yard from the outer perimeter of the prison. Officer 
Varner ordered Defendant to stop but Defendant crossed over the fence into an area where 
inmates are not permitted under any circumstances, and ran towards the outer perimeter fences. 
Officer Varner notified perimeter security, which drove to the site on the perimeter fence where 
Mr. Germonto was attempting to climb. Upon seeing the officers Mr. Germonto dropped from 
the fence and attempted to evade security by running parallel to the perimeter fence. In 
connection with the efforts to stop Mr. Germonto the officers orally instructed him to stop and 
displayed their weapons. Mr. Germonto was eventually subdued after running approximately 100 
yards. He was searched, found to be wearing multiple layers of clothing, a. State-issued winter 
coat, gloves and other protective apparel. 
At the i'leliiitiiuiy 1 fearing Defendant's ai gument was a challenge to what constitutes 
ape from official custody " In Utah, the crime of escape from official custody requires a (i) 
. * nig, (ii) from, official custodx {defined as 'confinement'), (iii) without authorization. At the 
hearing Defendant effectivel) conceded that the State had made a case for "attempted escape" but 
argued Thai his actions could not, as a matter of law, constitute "escape" since he had never 
. hed the final perimeter fence. The subsequent briefing by defense counsel addressed these 
. -nil in greater detail, citing to two cases (from I ouisiana and Missouri) where the courts did not 
tiiid "escape" had been completed. Urging the Court to give the term "escape'1 its normal and 
oi dmary meaning, Defendant's counsel argued that as long as the Defendant had not left the 
geographic boundaries of the prison, the charge of "escape" could not lie Relying on the 
statutory definition of "confinement" the State argued that Defendant "completed the crime of 
escape when he left the housing area of the Timpanogos Unit," Reply Brief at 2, when he scaled 
the first fence separating the housing area 
At the outset, the Court notes that while the issue raised in this case does not appear to 
have been decided in Utah, by far the majority view is that prisoners may be convicted of "escape" 
even where they fail to leave the confines of a prison or institution See annotation, Conviction 
for Escape Where Prisoner Fails to Leave Confines of Prison or Institution, 79 A L R 4Ul 1060 
Indeed, it appears that only Louisiana and Missouri courts have held otherwise, and those few 
cases are clearly distinguishable In the Louisiana case, State v. Games, the prisoner had been 
assigned to work in an okra patch that was part of the prison grounds not restricted to inmates 
The Louisiana court read the applicable state statute to require the prisoner's departure from a 
physical place of confinement Since the prisoner in that case had never left the penitentiary 
grounds the court reversed the conviction for escape In this Court's view, Utah's statute is 
different in that it clearly evinces a legislative intent to define "confinement" to include more than 
the physical location Moreover, factually the Games case is distinguishable in that despite being 
ordered to desist, Mr Germonto scaled a fence and entered an area from which inmates are 
restricted at all times In other words, there is no conceivable circumstance under which Mr. 
Germonto would have been authorized to be in the area between the housing fences and the 
external perimeter fences The Missouri case, State v. Buck is also clearly distinguishable on its 
facts There the prisoner was charged with escape although he never made any effort to leave 
even the interior walls of the housing unit, but merely went into another cell where he then 
sexually assaulted that cell's occupant The Missouri court did note in Buck that escape occurred 
when "custodial detention had been breached " That certainly occurred in this case 
Utah's statute is inartfully drafted Nevertheless, it is evident from the face of the statute, 
specifically Utah Code Ann § 76-8-309(7)(b)(i-iv), that the Legislature viewed the term 
"confinement in a state prison" to include situations clearly occurring outside the geographic 
boundaries of the institution Thus, Defendant's attempt to limit the definition of confinement to 
a geographic boundary cannot be reconciled with the statutory language 
The only way to make sense of the examples of "confinement in a state prison" cited in the 
statute is to construe the terms to include those instances where the custodial authority has actual 
or constructive control over the inmate Accord Urbauer v. State, 744 P 2d 1274 (Ct Crim App 
1987) ("custody" may be restraint by either physical means or by a superior force acting as a 
moral restraint But there must be actual or constructive custody in order to have an escape 
[a]ny departure from such restraint or control, . . whether from the custody of an officer or from 
any place where one is lawfully confined may be adjudged an escape "). Here, Mr Germonto 
defied a proper demand by custodial authorities (initially Officer Varner, and later by perimeter 
security) that he descend from the fences which he did, or tried to, scale) Construing the 
evidence in favor of the prosecution, Mr Germonto intentionally disregarded the orders he was 
given and entered an area in which he had no right to be By doing so he placed himself outside 
actual or constructive official custody without authorization, completing the elements of "escape 
from official custody " 
The Defendant is bound over to stand trial for Escape from Official Custody a Secoi id 
Degree Felony. 
Dated Scptcmbei 8, *!<>(><> 
By the Court: 
